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Merging Law and Business History:
Case Study in the Development of Collateral 
in Japan at the Turn of the Twentieth Century1
Aki Kinjo
Introduction
Business history is an extraordinarily intellectually stimulating subject. It combines 
the best aspects of both business and history. Business history can not only contrib-
ute academically but also to the real world. Because there is nothing more practical 
than running a business, the study of business study can, and should, contribute to 
solving today’s challenges that organizations and societies are facing today. It can be 
a powerful tool to understand and solve today’s problems facing business by situating 
them in a historical perspective. It is an ideal area for academics who can leverage 
the professional experiences in business into a broader historical context.
Yet because of the ambiguity and complexities that accompany actual business 
activities, business history has not been able to establish a uniform methodology 
among its investigators. As a result, intensive world-wide debates on the methods 
that should be used in business history has been continuing in the last decade.2 Var-
ious disciplines and methodologies that have been deployed to advance the study of 
business history. Such eff orts include engagement with economics and management 
studies. Business historians have not been shy from adapting new concepts. They 
have been incorporating innovative concepts such as “cultural” and “linguistic turn” 
1  This paper draws on the presentation and subsequent discussions made at the Business History Conference 
held on April 7, 2018 in Baltimore, Maryland, USA. As such, it is formatted as a script with accompanying 
slides. I thank the participants at the conference as well as the generous cooperation by the Suwa Warehouse 
Company, the Hachijuni Cultural Foundation, and Kiyoshi Kurumi. This study is supported by Grants-in-Aid for 
Scientifi c Research by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (#16K03795) and a research grant from 
the Showa Kaikan Foundation.
2  In fact, the theme of the 54th Congress of the Business History Society of Japan held on September 29, 2018 
was “Shaping Business History: Going Beyond National, Disciplinary and Methodological Boundaries”. The Ple-
nary Session, particularly discussions by Takafumi Kurosawa, Pierre-Yves Donze, and Matthias Kipping, helped 
me understand the challenges facing the discipline of business studies as well the opportunities for a more cre-
ative approach.
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in historical studies that emphasize the importance of context and narrative.3
Surprisingly, however, there are very few business historians who have actively 
leveraged the development of laws in their studies. Law has not been adequately rec-
ognized as a useful device in the business historian’s tool box. In this paper, I argue 
that by understanding the development and its impact on business, the study of law 
can substantially advance the study of business history. Specifi cally, investigating the 
evolution of collateral that is at the cross section of law and business can be powerful 
in solving unanswered academic questions. To demonstrate the eff ectiveness of my 
argument, I provide a case study. I use the fi nancing of the silk reeling industry at 
the turn of the twentieth century to demonstrate the potential of deploying the study 
of law into business history. I hope it demonstrates that understanding the impact in 
the development of collateral can be quite fruitful in the advancement of banking his-
tory.
1. The Question: Who fi nanced the silk reeling manufacturers?
Silk reeling was an ideal industry for Japan to industrialize. It could leverage the 
indigenous̶yet pristine̶centuries-old production methods with the latest technol-
ogy at that time. Abundant cheap labor provided an advantage on manufacturing 
costs against competitors such as Italy. The strategy proved to be successful: raw silk 
became the top export item during the 75 years since Japan opened its port in 1859, 
after over three centuries of seclusion from the rest of the world. The percentage of 
raw silk in total exports from Japan was consistently around 40%. The export of raw 
silk signifi cantly accelerated in the early twentieth century, between 1902 and 1923. 
In 1909, Japan became the world’s largest exporter of raw silk, surpassing Italy.
3  For example, see Hansen, Per H. (2012) “Business history: A Cultural and Narrative Approach”, Business 
History Review, 86-4, pp.693-717; Hansen, Per H. (2006) “Networks, Narratives and New Markets: The Rise and 
Decline of Danish Modern Furniture Design, 1930-1970”, Business History Review, 80-3, pp.449-483; Lipartito, 
Kenneth (2013) “Connecting the Cultural and the Material in Business History”, Enterprise and Society, 14-4, 
pp.686-704.
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Figure 1
Who fi nanced the silk reeling manufacturers? This has been a key academic ques-
tion in the study of Japanese industrial fi nance. Arguably, it is one of the questions 
that kicked-off  this academic fi eld since the publication of the now classic Yamagu-
chi (1966) study. Previous studies, however, have primarily focused on the role of 
wholesale merchants as the fi nancers of the Japanese silk reeling industry. Wholesale 
merchants were intermediaries who sold raw silk to the foreign trading companies in 
the settlements in Yokohama and amassed a fortune. To the contrary, the research 
on the contribution of regional banks was largely neglected, recognized to be fringe 
players at best.4
I agree with the established view that from the 1860s to the turn of the twentieth 
century, the regional banks “piggy-backed” on the wholesale merchants. This is no 
surprise as the National Banking Decree, the fi rst ever banking law in Japanese his-
tory, was proclaimed only in 1872. Modern banking had just started in Japan, during 
the same period as the silk reeling industry took off  in the late nineteenth century.
4  In this paper, “regional bank” refers to banks that were established and did not mainly operate in large cities 
such as Tokyo, Yokohama, Nagoya or Osaka. 




Yet, as we will see, it was after the turn of the twentieth century that the export of 
Japanese raw silk seriously took off . Who funded the silk reeling manufacturers at the 
most important stage of the key industry in pre-war Japan? 
Figure 3
Government statistics show that when the export of raw silk from Japan reached 
its peak in 1930, the regional banks surpassed the wholesale merchants in lending to 
the silk reeling manufacturers. The regional banks, in aggregate, provided 150% more 
loans to the silk reeling manufacturers than the wholesale merchants. The established 
view does acknowledge the rise of the regional banks and the relative fall of the 
wholesale merchants. Yet, this view has failed to articulate the mechanism that en-
abled the increase of lending to the silk reeling manufacturers happened. How should 
we investigate this unsolved mystery? Competent FBI agents follow the money to 
investigate. Capable business historians follow the collateral. 
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Figure 4
The study of collateral has been largely ignored in Japan, not just by business 
historians, but also historians in general, economists and also to a large degree, prac-
titioners in fi nance. One reason is because in today’s Japan, almost 100% of the type 
of assets used as collateral for corporate loans is real estate. We have been mentally 
locked-in to the notion that collateral means real estate. Full stop. Pre-war Japan, 
however, was diff erent: the variety of assets devoted for collateral was much more 
diverse. Lenders were creative in developing assets other than real estate that can be 
deployed as collateral. One study indicates that negotiable securities were used most, 
followed by real estate. Importantly, moveable assets were widely used as collateral.
Figure 5
Strikingly, however, according to the survey conducted by the Ministry of Agri-
culture in 1919, almost half of the collateral used in the silk reeling industry were 
moveable assets. Thus, to articulate the rise of regional banks vis a vis the wholesale 
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merchants in silk reeling fi nance, it is critical to understand what kind of moveable 
assets were utilized as collateral, and how.
Figure 6
Let us dive into the details of silk reeling fi nance conducted by the regional banks, 
with eyes on the collateral. Our focal point is Nagano prefecture. Nagano, a moun-
tainous area situated between Kyoto and Tokyo, was the epicenter of silk reeling 
manufacturing in Japan, if not the world. Nagano produced 25% of raw silk in Japan, 
most of which exported to the US and Europe. Banks in Nagano delivered one third 
of all loans to the silk reeling manufacturers in Japan. Approximately 64.6% of all silk 
cocoons were used as collateral in Nagano prefecture in 1927.
Figure 7
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The Jyukyu Bank, established in Nagano in 1877, was the leader in Nagano’s silk 
reeling fi nance.5 In 1924, when Japan’s export of raw silk was booming, 80% of the 
Bank’s loans were delivered to the silk reeling manufacturers. The Jyukyu Bank was 
the “institutional bank” for the epicenter of silk reeling in Japan.6
Until the beginning of the twentieth century, however, the Jyukyu Bank lacked the 
capital and technology to fi nance the silk reeling manufacturers.7 At the turn of the 
century, the president of the bank, Takajiro Kurosawa, spearheaded the eff ort of in-
novating the capabilities and culture of the Jyukyu Bank to become the leading bank 
in fi nancing the silk reeling manufacturers in Nagano. What did he do? He built mas-
sive warehouses to convert silk cocoons into collateral.
Figure 8
Creating and preserving the asset value was a necessary condition for converting 
silk cocoons to collateral. Another important condition was ensuring that the security 
interest in the collateral was legally protected against the debtor and a third party. 
Warehouses were needed to overcome these challenges. Silk cocoons are moveable 
goods, thus making it tricky to be used as collateral compared to other assets, such 
as real estate. To begin with, they are a liquid commodity, i.e., they tend to be moved 
around and frequently change their value. 
5  Which literally means the Nineteenth Bank, indicating that it was the nineteenth national bank established 
under the National Banking Decree. All national banks were private banks. The bank is one of the origins of 
the current Hachijuni Bank.
6  Bank of Japan, Matsumoto Branch, Seishi kinyū [Silk reeling fi nance] in Nihon kinyū’shi shiryo Meiji Taisho 
hen [Japanese fi nancial history documents, Meiji and Taisho era] vol. 23 (Tokyo: Bank of Japan Research De-
partment, 1960. Originally published in 1924), 671.
7  Masaki Nakabayashi, “The Rise of Modern Silk Reeling Industry and Financial Institutions: The Formation of 
the Institution of Providing Advances on Documentary Bills,” Japanese Yearbook on Business History 18 (2001): 
120.




Hence, the secured lender must monitor the condition and value of the collateral. 
Maintaining a professional warehouse to do these tasks proved benefi cial. In addition, 
having advanced scientifi c expertise to dry and store the silk cocoons helped pre-
serve their value. Under the Japan Civil Code in the early Meiji era, the only way to 
treat a moveable asset as collateral was to treat it is a pawn item. That would be fi ne 
for a pawnbroker; however, for the silk reeling manufacturers, it would in eff ect pro-
hibit them from using the raw material that is essential for producing silk.8
Figure 10
The new Commercial Code that came into eff ect in 1899 created a breakthrough, 
as a section on the deposit of goods to warehouses was established.9 It clearly stated 
8  Real estate did not have such issues because if a mortgage was permitted, it allowed the debtor to freely use 
the pledged asset as long as conditions pertinent to lending were met. To this day, Japanese law does not allow 
lenders to pledge for a mortgage with moveable goods.
9  It may be the case that the Commercial Code formalized the business practice from the Edo period by using 
warehouses to secure assets.
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that warrants issued by warehouses (warehouse receipts, kura’ni shoken) were al-
lowed to have the legal status of a commercial bill that could be negotiable.
Figure 11
As such, goods in the warehouse would be deemed to be legally transferred to oth-
er parties by negotiating the warehouse receipts, without any actual physical trans-
fers.10 In eff ect, silk cocoons were emancipated from being treated as a pawn item and 
became much closer to being mortgaged.
Figure 12
Such legal framework signifi cantly facilitated the use of silk cocoons as collateral. 
Establishing the Suwa Warehouse in 1909 was a major breakthrough.11 Takajiro Kuro-
sawa simultaneously became president of the Jyukyu Bank and the Suwa Warehouse. 
10  Kijūrō Arita, Sōko gyō kōgi [Lecture on warehouses] (Osaka: Shin Tōyō Kōgi,1974), 102-103.
11  Ueda Warehouse merged with the Suwa Warehouse in 1910. The company still exists today. The Suwa 
Warehouse and the Jyukyu Bank were legally separate entities with no capital relationships.
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The warehouse business proved to be successful.12 In 1918, the Suwa Warehouse 
operated the largest warehouse facility in Asia, with a land area of approximately 
100,000 square meters (over twice the size of Tokyo Dome) with 55 warehouses.13 The 
percentage of moveable assets in the Jyukyu Bank’s collateral pool increased from un-
der 10% in 1901 to over 60% in 1912.14 The amount of loans provided by the Jyukyu 
Bank to the silk reeling manufacturers dramatically after the Suwa Warehouse was 
established. The collateralization of silk cocoons played a signifi cant role in propelling 
the eff ort. That contributed to the increase in the export of raw silk from Japan.
Figure 13
Figure 14
12  The Suwa Warehouse has never reported a loss in its net earnings to this date.
13  Takeo Kurosawa, Choken sōko oyobi kanken gyō [Silk cocoon warehouses and business of drying silk co-
coons]. Retrieved from National Diet Library (Japan), Digital Library http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/961919.
14  Hachijuni Bank, Hachijūni Ginkō’shi [History of the Hachijūni Bank], 57.
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2. Question: What was the relationship between the government and banks?
In the previous section, I demonstrated that focusing on collateral could help deci-
pher how regional banks were able to surpass wholesale merchants in lending to the 
silk reeling manufacturers. Using silk cocoons as collateral by means of issuing ware-
house receipts played a crucial role. That was one of the primary drivers that en-
abled the Suwa region to become an industrial cluster in silk reeling. In this section, I 
illustrate that collateral played an important role in achieving the delicate balance of 
government intervention and maintaining market discipline.
Money, finance and capital are crucial when a country is leapfrogging from an 
underdeveloped country to an economically developed one. The role of the state, 
with focus to its adequate level of involvement with the private sector, has been the 
central question in the studies of banking history. If the state intervenes too much it 
could dampen or kill the vibrant animal spirit of the private sector. Yet, if the state 
does not actively engage when it should in times of market failures, the game itself 
could well end. During an economic crisis, when and how should the central bank 
save a private bank without creating “zombie” companies? We continue to face today 
the challenges of balancing these often-confl icting objectives. In this presentation, I 
focus on how Japan resolved this challenge in the early twentieth century.
A multitude of previous studies have investigated the over-arching role of the gov-
ernment in modernizing Japan after the Meiji Restoration in 1868. I argue, however, 
that some regional banks also played a crucially important role in enabling state inter-
vention in a time of crisis, while maintaining market discipline. Specifi cally, I demon-
strate that collateral played an important role in establishing the fi ne line of keeping 
the vibrant market mechanism while having the public sector jump in during market 
failures. The Jyukyu Bank and the Bank of Japan, the central bank, were able to 
achieve this goal through the Suwa Warehouse.
Collateralized silk cocoons helped the Jyukyu Bank tap into the vast liquidity pool 
of the central banking system. As explained later, the Suwa Warehouse became the 
fi rst “authorized warehouse” by the Bank of Japan, Matsumoto Branch, in 1914, en-
abling the Bank of Japan to provide secured lending to the Jyukyu Bank with silk 
cocoons as collateral.15 Using silk cocoons as collateral for lending to silk reeling man-
15  Suwa Warehouse, Suwa sokō nanajūgonen’shi [75 year history of the Suwa Warehouse] (Okaya: Suwa Ware-
house Co., Ltd., 1986), 129-133. This mechanism was similar to those established by the wholesale merchants in 
Yokohama.
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ufacturers along with funding from the Bank of Japan helped position the Jyukyu 
Bank to become the leading lender in silk reeling fi nance.16 It also helped the regional 
bank from collapsing during a fi nancial crisis.
The two banks were mutually dependent. The BoJ needed a thriving silk reeling 
industry to collect and accumulate gold, the specie to drive the modernization of the 
country. The Jukyu Bank had to rely on the central bank during a market crisis, and 
together, they anticipated and prepared for the crash in the global silk market. 
The crisis happened in 1920 when the wartime boom for exporting Japanese raw 
silk caused by World War One upended. The price of the raw silk traded in Yokoha-
ma plummeted 71.5% in 1920, from a record high of JPY 3,860 to 1,100. The crash was 
a major blow to the silk reeling manufacturers in Nagano.
There have been speculations on how the Jyuku Bank and the Bank of Japan col-
laborated to manage the crisis. Although we knew that there were crucial meetings 
held as to resolve the market crash, to the best of my knowledge, there was no evi-
dence to prove what exactly happened. I recently found a 32-page meeting memoran-
dum that documents, in detail, on what the two banks agreed upon in the archives of 
the Hachijuni Bank, the successor of the Jukyu Bank.
Figure 15
16  Masatsune Ito, “Sei’shi yōsan’gyō no dō’ran to chihō ginkō no sonzai keitai: 1920 nen’dai no nagono ken wo 
taishō to shite” [The trembling of silk reeling and sericulture and existence pattern of regional banks: a study 
of Nagano prefecture in the 1920s], Tochi Seidoshigaku, 29, no.1 (1975): 15. 
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The memorandum produced by the Jyukyu Bank vividly depicts the meeting with 
Hosaku Iijima, the president of Jukyu Bank and Eigo Fukai, the executive director 
the BoJ (who later became the governor). To sum up, the Jyukyu Bank faced a fund-
ing crisis. Funding was the Achilles heel of the regional bank̶before the crash, it 
relied heavily on other banks, 33 in total, to procure funds. In eff ect, Jukyu Bank was 
an avenue for these banks to invest in the thriving silk reeling industry. After the 
market crash, however, these banks were the fi rst to withdraw the investment, being 
opportunistic, rather than strategic providers of capital. As a reslt, the Jukyu Bank’s 
external funding dropped by 61.5% compared to its previous year, from JPY 25.0 to 9.3 
million. Hence, the Jyukyu Bank had to lean on the central bank to receive liquidity. 
Figure 16
Even by vastly reducing the total amount of lending in the latter half of that year 
to 60% of the previous year, the Jyukyu Bank still needed JPY 3.8 million to enable 
the silk reeling manufacturers in Nagano to continue their business. Without them, 
Japan could not earn enough specie needed for further industrialization and economic 
growth.
The BoJ could not and cannot, by law, be a binge lender. It needed a solid ground 
to assure that they were lending to a credible borrower. For this purpose, the Jukyu 
Bank had established its own internal credit rating system, ranking the silk reeling 
manufacturers from A to E, and no rating.




Rediscounting bills for creditworthy debtors was one of the core operations of the 
central bank stipulated in its bylaws. Thus, the regional bank could request the BoJ 
to discount bills for borrowers who had a high credit rating of A or B. Such measure 
brought JPY 2.2 million from the BoJ to the Jyukyu Bank. But the regional bank still 
needed JPY 1.6 million to the less creditworthy but nonetheless important borrowers 
with credit ratings of C, D and no rating. 
11
Borrowers





No rating 30 1%
2,190 100%
Source: Archives of the Hachijuni Bank
Figure 18
The question that needed resolving was how could the central bank indirectly lend 
to borrowers with weak credit, via the Jyukyu Bank, without jeopardizing its own 
credibility as a prudent and equitable lender? The BoJ and the Jyukyu Bank relied 
on a warehouse company to achieve these confl icting goals.
For silk reeling manufacturers with weak credit, the Jyukyu Bank had developed a 
unique lending technology around the turn of the twentieth century: secured lending 
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using silk cocoons as collateral. For this purpose, a signifi cant warehouse company was 
established. By storing silk cocoons in the warehouses, the Jyukyu Bank could use the 
cocoons as collateral for providing secured loans to the silk reeling manufacturers.
Such measures were possible because a new Commercial Code came into eff ect in 
1899, allowing the warrants issued by the warehouses, or “warehouse receipts (kurani 
shōken),” to have the same legal status of a negotiable commercial bill. Although loans 
secured by silk cocoons consisted 22% of total lending, it served only silk reeling man-
ufacturers with weak credit. The credit rating of the borrowers of such loans were 
47% C, and 53% D or no rating.
The Suwa Warehouse, was established in 1909. (Suwa was the region where the 
bulk of silk reeling manufacturers in Nagano congregated). The warehouse receipt 
issued by the Suwa Warehouse was designated by the BoJ as offi  cially qualifi ed col-
lateral. By providing such warehouse receipts issued by the Suwa Warehouse, the 
Jyukyu Bank was able to use silk cocoons as collateral as a condition to receive loans 
from the BoJ.
Figure 19
On such terms, the BoJ agreed to lend JPY 1.0 million to the Jyukyu Bank, just 
enough to avert the funding crisis. The central bank was able to indirectly lend to 
the weaker silk reeling manufacturers by relying on the regional bank’s credit risk 
management capabilities.
The measure of using silk cocoons as collateral for loans by the BoJ was also an exe-
cution of a signifi cant policy change. At the turn of the century, the Meiji government 
changed its industrialization policy from a top down, centralized approach to a more 
localized one by encouraging regional banks to promote local businesses. Because silk 
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reeling was one of the most important businesses, the BoJ establish its branch in 
Matsumoto city, Nagano prefecture in 1914. One month after establishing the Matsumo-
to Branch, the Suwa Warehouse was authorized as a “designated warehouse” thereby 
allowing its warehouse receipts to be used as offi  cial collateral of the BoJ.
So, what was the relationship between the Suwa Warehouse and the Jukyu Bank? 
These were independent companies without capital ties, yet they were deeply con-
nected. Takajiro Kurosawa who presided as president of the Juykyu Bank was also 
president of the Suwa Warehouse. The warehouse business proved to be fi nancially 
and operationally successful: in 1918, the Suwa Warehouse became the largest ware-
house facility in Asia, with a land area of approximately 100,000 square meters (over 
twice the size of Astro Dome), and held 55 large warehouses.
The Suwa Warehouse acted, in eff ect, as the independent collateral agent for the 
Jyukyu Bank. The cost of silk cocoons consisted of approximately 80% of the total 
cost of silk reeling. Thus, by monitoring the fl ow of silk cocoons, the Jyukyu Bank 
was able to collect, synthesize and generate information about the local silk reeling 
manufacturers. The BoJ relied on and trusted the monitoring and screening capabil-
ities of the Jyukyu Bank and the Suwa Warehouse. Because the Bank and the Ware-
house could allocate capital to the “right” silk reeling manufacturers̶which the BoJ 
could not do by itself̶the central bank was able to provide liquidity in times of need 
to the market without creating “zombie” borrowers.
Such cooperation between the State and the private sector, as demonstrated by the 
relationship between the Jyukyu Bank, Suwa Warehouse and the BoJ was crucial in 
industrializing and modernizing Japan. The collaborative network between the state 
and the commercial market, by allowing the state to intervene only in time of crisis, 
was the prime driver for Japan’s pre-war industrial development.
As we have seen, having a legal prism helps clear the business historian’s eyes. The 
establishment of a new legal framework had a profound eff ect in the rise of regional 
banks in silk reeling fi nance. The new Commercial Code that came into eff ect in 1899 
created a breakthrough to enable moveable assets such as silk cocoons to become col-
lateral by using warehouse receipts. The Bank of Japan actively leveraged this change 
in law to provide liquidity by means of loans secured by silk cocoons to the Jyukyu 
Bank when liquidity virtually evaporated from the market. This case study, focusing 
on the development of law and its impact, demonstrated how a major regional bank 
became the leader in silk reeling fi nance once dominated by the wholesale merchants. 
I hope that following the collateral will further advance studies in business history.
（本学教授）
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